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Abstract
We construct a privacy-preserving, distributed and decentralized market-
place where parties can exchange data for tokens. In this market, buyers
and sellers make transactions in a blockchain and interact with a third party,
called notary, who has the ability to vouch for the authenticity and integrity
of the data. We introduce a protocol for the data-token exchange where
neither party gains more information than what it is paying for, and the ex-
change is fair: either both parties gets the other’s item or neither does. No
third party involvement is required after setup, and no dispute resolution is
needed.
1 Introduction
Fair exchange, smart contracts and contingent payments have occupied the cryptographic
community for decades. They relate to problems where parties exchange a piece of data or
a service, for data or payment. We look here upon the problem of selling personal data.
The importance of privacy in digital transactions continues to grow in these times, when
marketing is ubiquitous and based on the footprint of digitalized lives. Individuals are
willing to loosen their privacy expectations in exchange for a service (e.g., social networks
or webmail services) or even money.
Consider a a distributed and decentralized marketplace where some parties can buy personal
data. For example, an apparel company is willing to pay for the 2-weeks browsing history
of people who went to Coachella Festival, or a financial institution willing to pay for the
last places visited by people between the ages of 20 and 35, earning over $150K, in New
York City. We are interested in (i) a question that can be encoded in a predicate that we call
audience matching criteria, and (ii) a payload, or piece of information, tied to this predicate.
In this market, a buyer publishes an offer that includes an audience match criterion, a pay-
load description, and an amount he is willing to pay for an answer. A trusted third party
creates certificates for the sellers, wherein a certificate contains an authenticated answer
for an offer (e.g., authenticated audience match value and payload). Each seller receives
certificates, and when he receives an offer, he interacts with the buyer to evaluate the audi-
ence criterion. When there is a match, the buyer starts a contract in a blockchain and the
seller closes the contract. With an atomic swap, tokens are exchanged for the data. This
trusted third party can be materialized as a bank, who can certify questions about spending
and financial status; or a telecommunications company, which can certify the geographical
location of its subscribers (via triangulation with the antennas their cell phones connect to).
Contributions and Related Work
We introduce a decentralized and distributed marketplace for selling personal digital data.
The market design we present was used as a blueprint for a real construct, and the abstrac-
tions adhere to realistic security problems.
We design an UC-ideal functionality which implements secure exchanges, and a real life
protocol that securely realizes this. This protocol is privacy friendly: it hides data and
transactions from the public. If parties are honest, then the buyer, and only the buyer, can
access this data and the seller gets paid.
The protocol and marketplace formalize an existing data marketplace named Wib-
son (Travizano et al., 2018; Fernandez et al., 2020). The secure exchange mechanism was
presented in Futoransky et al. (2019). This marketplace uses an Ethereum side-chain, and a
gas efficient protocol named BatPay for the recurrent micropayment of tokens (Mayer et al.,
2020). Users connect through a mobile app in their phones, and check a message board
where buyers post their offers. The solution herein needs to conforms with a high standard
both in terms of the security and privacy, and in terms of the computational and communi-
cation costs. Additionally, this marketplace features a cryptographic primitive called Wib-
sonTree, designed to preserve users’ privacy by allowing them to demonstrate predicates on
their personal attributes, without revealing the values of those attributes (Futoransky et al.,
2020).
In a fair exchange, two parties wish to exchange a piece of data each holds and is secret to
the other. While a result by Cleve (1986) shows that basic fair exchange is impossible in a 2-
party setting, modifications and restrictions demonstrate that it is achievable (Asokan et al.,
2000; Micali, 2003; Okada et al., 2008; Campanelli et al., 2017).
The setting of the paper differs from the models underlying these articles. Campanelli et al.
(2017) uses a blockchain to perform atomic swaps, but moves to use this for providing
services, such as Sudoku-puzzle solving through ZK-proofs.
2 A Model for Decentralized Exchange of Digital Goods
We use the Universal Composable Security framework (Canetti, 2001) to formalize the no-
tion of a marketplace. We use the Fca–hybrid model, where parties are allowed to register
and retrieve public keys from a certification authority (Canetti, 2003). We use the plain
communication model with unauthenticated asynchronous communication, without guar-
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anteed delivery and with possible replay (see for example Canetti (2000)). Furthermore, we
restrict attacks to static Byzantine corruptions.
The protocol is played by two main parties, a seller S and a buyer B. A third party, the
notary N , vouches for the authenticity of data. That is, the notary may provide a seller
with a ‘certificate’ which includes data and an audience match value binded to the seller’s
id. A fourth party, W , plays the role of a blockchain. It is known (Badertscher et al.,
2017; Garay et al., 2015; Kiayias et al., 2015) that not all the properties of a blockchain are
captured by an Interactive Turing Machine (ITM). Nonetheless, we model the blockchain
as an ITM for the sake of simplicity, capturing some of its properties.
Parties have an account with the blockchain that is binded to their id, i.e., they registered
a signature verification public key v with Fca andW has retrieved them all. Furthermore,
we assume that the notary N is known by all parties, i.e., they know that the id N is
associated with a notary that can sign data and this data ought to be trusted. W stores a
table (ledger) where each party id is associated with an amount of tokens the party owns,
and publishes updates on each output. Assume that on initialization, W receives the initial
state of the ledger. At any point W is allowed to make token transfers from one account
to the other, or to momentarily immobilize a token. We assume no tokens are created or
removed. In order to model the blockchain’s ability to multicast messages, we assume that
W writes messages to a ‘public’ tape, and the adversary may decide deliver it to any party,
like it does with any message. Similarly, we assume that buyers multicast messages and the
adversary may decide what to do with them.
The blockchain,W , executes a contract: it receives messages of the form
(ContractOpen, id, ‘Pay N if x : H(x) = X’)
and
(Contract Close, sid,K).
When W receives a ContractOpen–message, if this is the first contact with this id and
the sender has N tokens for payment, then W immobilizes N tokens, and puts the mes-
sage in its public tape. When receiving a Contract Close–message, W checks for a stored
ContractOpen–message sid which has not been closed, he checks if H(K) = X. If equal-
ity holds, W transfers N tokens from sender of the Open message to sender of the Close
message, and considers the contract closed. Else, W ignores the Contract Close-message
and wait for a new one.
We assume that we are given a function f defining all audience criteria. For a seller attribute
s and a buyer attribute b, f can be evaluated in polynomial time and f(s,b) = 1 if, and
only if, s matches the criterion defined by b. We assume that all the negotiation details
are encoded in s and b, including the price offered by the buyer, which for the sake of
simplicity, we have fixed at 1 token.
Preliminaries
Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme and H a collision-resistant hash func-
tion. We require that Π offers semantic security and remains safe even if an adversary
is given Hash(K) (cf. Futoransky et al. (2006)). This standard requirement in practice
does not follow from the definitions. Nonetheless, this can be attained for example starting
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from a secure block cipher (E,D) (Boneh and Shoup, 2020), a mode of operation that al-
lows transmitting messages of polinomially-bounded length (with a resulting semantically-
secure symmetric cipher), and with H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k the (preimage-resistant) hash
function H constructed from Enc (see Black et al. (2002)).
Let Fsmt be the ideal-process secure message transmission functionality of Canetti (2001)
and let piE be a real-life protocol securely realizing Fsmt, e.g., the protocol of op. cit.
constructed out of a public-key encryption scheme that is semantically secure against cho-
sen plaintext attack. We assume the leakage function for Fsmt to provide the adversary
with the message header and the size of the secret (non-header) portion of the message.
Let Fsig be the signature ideal functionality of Canetti (2003) and let piS be a signature
scheme which is eu-cma; hence this protocol securely realizes Fsig (Goldwasser et al.,
1988; Canetti, 2003)).
3 The Secure Exchange Functionality
We introduce the (abstract) ideal functionality that enables secure exchanges. The protocol
has three steps, during setup the notary receives an input (S,M, s) consisting in the id
of a seller S , a piece of data (or message) M , and the seller’s attribute s; next comes the
offer where the buyer advertises an audience criterion through an attribute b; and finally,
the seller responds to the offer and the exchange takes place.
The ideal functionality shown in Fig. 1 gives the adversary the power to decide who gets the
offers, as the adversary controls the communication network, and hence also if the seller’s
message, which closes the transaction, reaches the blockchain, and if the blockchain’s mes-
sage can reach B or S .
4 The Secure Exchange Protocol
Let k ∈ Z. The protocol ρse in the (Fsmt,Fsig,Fca)-hybrid model goes as follows.
1. When the notary N receives an input (Certify, sid,S,M, s), he computes K ←
Gen(1k), the ciphertext C ← Enc(K,M), the hashes Y := H(C),X := H(K),
and invokes Fsig with (Sign, sid, (s, Y,X)) to receive a signature σ. When done,
N sends (Cert, sid,K,M,C, s, Y,X, σ) to S via Fsmt.
2. Upon receiving (Cert, sid,K,M,C, s, Y,X, σ), the seller invokes Fca with
(Retrieve,N ) and waits for (Retrieve,N , v), next he invokes Fsig with (Verify,
N , (s, Y,X), σ, v) and waits for an answer. If the signature is valid, Y =
H(C),X = H(K) andM = Dec(K,C), he outputs (Cert received, sid).
3. When B receives (Buy, bid,b), he multicasts (Buying, bid,b).
4. Upon receiving (Buying, bid,b), and if it is the first offer with this bid, a seller
stores the message and outputs (Offer received, bid).
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Functionality Fse
1. Upon receiving (Certify, sid,S,M, s) fromN check that sid = (N , sid′) and that
no other Certify message was received with the same sid.
• If S is uncorrupted, send (Cert, sid,S, |M |, |s|) to the adversary. Upon re-
ceiving (Cert Received, sid) from the adversary, send (Cert Received, sid) to
S and store (sid,S,M, s).
• If the seller S has been corrupted, send (Cert, sid,S,M, s) to the adversary
and store (sid,S,M, s).
2. Upon receiving an offer (Buy, bid,b) from a buyer, forward to the adversary. Each
time the adversary sends a message (Buy, bid,b, id) send (Buying, bid,b) to party
with id id and store the message.
3. Upon receiving (Seller, bid, sid), retrieve (if any) a stored certificate with id sid,
and an offer with id bid. If fs(b) = 1, send the message (Seller, bid, sid) to the
adversary.
• Upon receiving (Contract Close, bid) from the adversary, transfer 1 token
from B to S.
• Upon receiving (Finished, bid) from the adversary when the N is uncor-
rupted, send (Message, bid,M) to B, or upon receiving (Finished, bid,M ′)
from the adversary when N is corrupted, send (Message, bid,M ′) to B; then
abort.
Figure 1: The ideal functionality Fse.
5. When the seller receives (Sell, sid, bid),he looks in his storage for a certificate and
an offer with these ids. If he finds them and f(b, s) = 1, S sends the message
(Selling, bid,N , C, s, Y,X, σ) to B via Fsmt and stores (sid, bid).
6. When the buyer receives a Selling–message, he invokes Fca with (Retrieve,N )
waits to receive a tag v, he invokes Fsig with (Verify,N , (s, Y,X), σ, v) waits
to receive an affirmative verification, and if this happens checks that f(b, s) =
1. If anything fails, he ignores. Else, he sends the message (ContractOpen, bid,
‘Pay if x : H(x) = X’) toW .
7. Upon receiving a ContractOpen–message, W checks if the sender has a balance
of at least one token and ignores of he does not. Else,W immobilizes a token from
the sender and multicasts the ContractOpen–message.
8. Upon reading a ContractOpen–message for a bid S for a stored pair (bid, sid),
retreives the key associated to sid and sends (Contract Close, bid,K) toW .
9. Upon receiving (Contract Close, bid,K) from S , the blockchain W looks for
an associated ContractOpen–message and ignores if not found or if it is al-
ready closed. Else, he computes H(K). If it agrees with X, then he multicasts
(Contract Close, bid,K) in his public tape and transfers the immobilized token to
S and modifies the ledger to reflect this change.
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10. Upon reading (Contract Close, bid,K), B outputs (Message, bid,Dec(K,C)).
11. Upon reading in the new state of the ledger that he was payed, the seller outputs
(Payment received, bid).
5 The Main Result
We now prove that the real-life protocol securely realizes the ideal functionality.
Theorem 1. Protocol pise securely realizes Fse in the Fca–hybrid model.
Proof. By the UC composition theorem it suffices to show that ρse securely realizes func-
tionality Fse in the (Fsmt,Fsig,Fca)–hybrid model. Let A be a (Fsig,Fsmt,Fca)–hybrid
model adversary. We define an ideal-process adversary (e.g., a simulator) A˜ such that the
execution in the ideal-process model and in the (Fsmt,Fsig,Fca)-hybrid models are indis-
tinguishable by any environment E . The simulator runs an execution with the environment
E and, in parallel, simulates a virtual copy of the hybrid adversary A. That is, A˜ acts as an
interface between A and E by imitating a copy of a real execution of ρse for A, incorporat-
ing E’s ideal-model interactions and forwarding A’s messages to E .
Assume no corruptions happens.
When A˜ receives (Cert, sid,S, |M |, |s|) from the ideal functionality Fse, A˜ computes:
• K ← Gen(1k),
• a random string M˜ ∈ {0, 1}|M | of size |M |,
• C˜ ← Enc(K, M˜ ),
• the hashes Y := H(C),X := H(K),
and simulates Fsig sending (Sign,N , (s, Y,X)) to A.
When A answers with (Signature,N , (s, Y,X), σ), A˜ simulates N sending
(Cert,sid,|(K,M,C, s, Y,X,σ)|)
to S through Fsmt.
1 If A delivers a Cert–message, then A˜ simulates Fca sending
(Retrieve,N ,S) to A. If the hybrid adversary answers ok, then A˜ simulates Fsig sending
(Verify,N , (s, Y,X), σ, v) to A and mimics Fsig verification algorithm. If the verification
checks out, A˜ sends (Cert Received, sid) to Fse.
When A˜ receives (Buy, sid,b) from functionality Fse, he simulates B multicasting
(Buying, sid,b). Next, each time A delivers the message to a party with id id, A˜ sends
(Buying, sid,b, id) to Fse.
Upon A˜ receiving (Sell, sid, bid) from the ideal functionality, A˜ simulates S sending
(Selling, bid, C, (s, Y,X), σ) to B through Fsmt. Upon A delivering a Selling–message,
the ideal-process adversary simulates Fca sending (Retrieve,N ,B) to the hybrid adver-
sary. Party A˜ waits for A to answer with ok, then A˜ simulates B by sending toW
(ContractOpen, bid, ‘Pay if x : H(x) = X’)
1Note that A˜ only needs the size of the message and not its contents, to simulate this for A, e.g., he can
send a string of 1s of the correct size and A cannot distinguish one from the other.
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and waits for A to deliver this to W . When this happens, the ideal-process adversary
checks if B has at least one token in its account, and ignores if there is less. Else A˜
‘immobilizes’ one simulated token, and simulates W multicasting the ContractOpen–
message. When A delivers this message to S , the ideal-process adversary simulates S
sending (Contract Close, bid,K) toW . UponA delivering a Contract Close–message with
id bid, A˜ verifies that H(K) = X and if this happens, A˜ sends (Contract Close, bid) to
Fse and simulatesW putting this message in its public tape. Upon the adversary A delivers
this message, A˜ sends (Finished, bid) to the ideal functionality Fse.
In order to conclude that the result follows in the uncorrupted case, first notice that the de-
lays in message delivery are incorporated by simulator so that all outputs are synchronized.
Second, note that the hybrid adversary learns the headers:
• (Cert, sid),
• (Selling, sid),
• the size |(K,M, s, C,X, σ)|,
• the size |(s, C,X, σ)|.
He also learns the full contents of
• (Buying, sid,b),
• (ContractOpen, sid, ‘Pay if x : H(x) = X’),
• (Contract Close, sid,K),
• and who receives the first of these messages.
These are computationally indistinguishable and thus the result follows.
Assume A corrupts N .
In that case A˜ corrupts N˜ and has dummy N˜ output what N outputs. When A˜ receives
(Cert, sid,S,M, s) from the ideal functionality Fse, he simulates the environment sending
this to the simulated N as input. Moreover, A˜ simulates the other parties for N/A. In
particular, if the simulated N/A sends a message
(Cert, sid,K ′,M ′, C ′, s′, Y ′,X ′, σ′)
through Fsmt to S , then the ideal-process adversary continues the simulation as in the un-
corrupted case.
The corruption of the notary can only influence the certificate sent to the seller, which is the
only message sent by the notary. IfN/A sends a certificate which does not have the correct
format, or the signature validation is not passed:
Y ′ 6= H(C ′) or X ′ 6= H(K ′) or C ′ 6= Dec(K ′, C ′),
then the seller ignores the message. Assume then that all these controls are passed. Then the
simulator continues as in the uncorrupted case: A˜ simulatesW sending the Contract Close–
message to B. If the adversary A delivers this message, A˜ sends (Finished, bid,M ′) to the
ideal functionality Fse. Hence, both the B and B˜ pay forM
′.
Assume the hybrid adversary corrupts S .
In this case the simulator corrupts S˜ . Additionally he has S˜ output what S outputs. When
A˜ receives (Cert, sid,S, s,M) from the ideal functionality Fse, he proceeds analogously
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to the uncorrupted case, changing the fake values for real ones. More precisely, A˜ simulates
key generation, encryption and hashing with the real values, and then invoking Fsig with
(Sign,N , (s, Y,X)). Upon obtaining (Signature,N , (s, Y,X), σ) from the hybrid adver-
sary, A˜ simulates sending
(Cert, sid,K,M,C, s, Y,X, σ)
from N to S through Fsmt. (Note that here A˜ holds M and s, generates K , computes
X,C and σ –same as ρse.) When the hybrid adversary delivers the message, A˜ sends
(Cert Received, sid) to the ideal functionality Fse.
Upon receiving (Buy, bid,b), A˜ continues like in the uncorrupted case.
Upon receiving (Sell, sid, bid) from Fse, A˜ simulates S receiving the same message from
the environment. If the corrupted seller, S , sends a message
(Selling, sid, C ′, s′, Y ′,X ′, σ′)
to B through Fsmt, the ideal-process adversary simulates Fca sending
(Retrieve,N ,B)
to the hybrid adversary and if A answers with ok, then A˜ simulates Fsig sending
(Verify,N , (s′, Y ′,X ′), σ′, v) and ignores if the signature validation is not passed. Else,
A˜ simulates B by sending toW
(ContractOpen, sid, ‘Pay if x : H(x) = X’).
If the hybrid adversary delivers the message, A˜ simulates W writing this message to its
public tape. When the hybrid adversary delivers the message to the S , A˜ waits for S to
send (Contract Close, bid,K ′) to W . A˜ checks if K ′ = K and ignores if it does not
hold. Else, the ideal-process adversary sends (Contract Close, sid) toFse and simulatesW
writing (Contract Close, sid,K) to its public tape. If A delivers, A˜ sends (Finished, sid)
to the ideal functionality Fse. Again, E can’t distinguish the hybrid from ideal-process
protocol executions.
The cases where the adversary corrupts W or multiple parties is left out for the sake of
brevity, thus concluding the proof.
6 Conclusion
Here we proposed a solution to the problem of trading real-world private information
using only cryptographic protocols and a public blockchain to guarantee the fairness of
transactions. We described a protocol that we call “Secure Exchange of Digital Goods”
(Futoransky et al., 2019) between a data buyer B and a data seller S . The protocol relies
on a trusted third party N , which also plays the role of notary in the context of a decen-
tralized Privacy-Preserving Data Marketplace (dPDM) such as the Wibson Marketplace
(Travizano et al., 2018; Fernandez et al., 2020).
This protocol converts the exchange of data into an atomic transaction where two things
happen simultaneously:
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• The buyer B gets access to the data, by learning the key that enables him to decrypt
C (previously received encrypted data).
• The seller S gets paid for his data by revealing the key.
There exists some open questions that cannot be addressed completely in this paper, but
are worth posing to understand the value of the model. For example, can we modify the
protocol so that s or b are not shared? How can we allow a seller to close a contract if he
does not have currency (e.g., Ethereum gas) to pay for the transaction? We have actually
developed a solution for this problem in (Mayer et al., 2020).
The implementation of the above protocol implies costs to all intervening parties. Each
transaction costs at least the computation of a hash, and if this turns to be expensive, the pro-
tocol needs to be optimized. This can be done with the BatPay smart contract (Mayer et al.,
2020).
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